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Rape is one of the major issues where the contribution of
feminist philosophical, social, and legal thought has been
particularly prominent. In this paper,1 the author takes a
critical look at the main tenets of the radical feminist view of
rape: that rape is not a deviation, but rather a deeply
entrenched social practice that both expresses and reinforces
far-reaching inequality and oppresion of women in our
society; that under these conditions a woman is not in a
position to give valid consent to sex with a man and that,
accordingly, the crime of rape should no longer be defined
in terms of lack of consent; that we need a new definition of
rape, which will help us recognize that rape is much more
widespread than we tend to assume; that all men in our
society are collectively responsible for the practice of rape. In
order to assess these arguments, the author focuses on the
contrast between the liberal and radical feminist views of
consent to sex. He tries to show that the radical feminist view
of rape is both much too crude and much too radical.
Feminism has exerted considerable influence on contempo-
rary public debates of social, moral, and legal issues; indeed,
it has to a large extent determined their agenda. Any attempt
at tackling such issues as marriage, abortion, or prostitution,
must take into account feminist views and arguments. Failure
to do so would be considered reason enough to question its
seriousness and relevance.
One of the issues where the influence of feminism and,
in particular, that of radical feminism, has been particulary
prominent is that of rape. In this paper I wish to take a criti-
cal look at the central tenets of the radical feminist understan-
ding of rape. Before doing so, I shall briefly describe the views
1 The paper is based
on the discussion




of rape that provided the background for the development of
that understanding.
I
Until several decades ago, both the interpretation of rape and
the laws pertaining to it were, by and large, informed by the
traditional sexist view of the relations between men and
women. On this view, the social and legal status of woman is
essentially determined by her relations to her husband or, if
she is unmarried, to her father or brother: her interests and
rights are taken to be included in those of the man. The cor-
responding account of rape, seldom spelled out but operative
none the less, finds the wrongness of rape not so much in the
violation of the raped woman's rights as in the infringement
of the man's rights. If the woman is unmarried, the father or
brother is assumed to have an interest in her virginity, which
is a condition of marrying her off. If she is married, the hus-
band is held to have the right of exclusive sexual access to her.
This account helps understand the wide incidence of rape
in war. In war, an almost exclusively male pursuit until quite
recently, raping enemy women was but another way of hit-
ting at the enemy himself. It also permeates much of the tra-
ditional rape law, starting with the usual definition of rape as
something only a man can do, and only a woman can suffer,
and as something a man does to a woman not his wife. It also
helps explain such an apparently aberrant state of affairs as the
virtual impossibility of a prostitute successfully suing for rape.
But then, proving rape in a legal system based on the tra-
ditional sexist outlook was not easy for any woman. Both sub-
stantive laws and the laws of evidence and procedure were
unfavorable to women, since they were predicated on the tra-
ditional view of male and female sexuality and sexual behav-
ior as basically different: the former active, assertive, even ag-
gressive, the latter initially passive and subsequently respon-
sive to male initiative. Some pressure on the part of the man and
some pretense of unwillingness on the part of the woman were
accordingly considered normal preliminaries to sexual inter-
course. This and some other sexist assumptions were given
expression in the famous caution of Lord Chief Justice Mat-
thew Hale that the charge of rape was one "easily to be made
and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the
party accused, tho' never so innocent" (quoted in Estrich, 1987,
5). Therefore the standards of proof of rape were made high-
er than those relating to other crimes. The definition of the
crime usually required prosecution to show that the defen-
dant had exerted actual force, and that the victim had offered
physical resistance. The victim's testimony often had to be cor-498
roborated by evidence from other sources. The defense was
usually allowed to bring in the victim's sexual past with a
view to impugning the credibility of her claim that she had
not consented. Some jurisdictions required that the rape be
reported soon after the event, if it was to stand a good chance
of being proven in court. Although some remnants of the tra-
ditional approach to rape are still to be found in rape law,
contemporary Western societies tend to see rape rather dif-
ferently. Rape is no longer understood as a crime where the
immediate victim is the woman raped, while the indirect, but
principal victim is a man. The woman raped is recognized as
the victim of rape. She has a right to bodily integrity; accord-
ingly, she is the one who decides whether another may or
may not touch her and engage her sexually. When another
person does so without her consent, he violates her right to bo-
dily integrity, and thereby also her personal autonomy, the
ground of this and other basic rights. In legal parlance, he
commits the crime of battery. Rape is thus understood as a
type of battery. Morally speaking, it is a serious wrong be-
cause it is a serious violation of personhood (see Shafer and
Frye, 1977, 339--340).
This view of rape is reflected in many of the current rape
law provisions. The reforms that have taken place in this area
in the last couple of decades have introduced sex-neutral def-
initions of rape: it now tends to be seen as a crime where both
the perpetrator and the victim may be either male or female.
This is made possible by no longer defining it in terms of pen-
etration of the female's sex organ by the male's. Because the
word "rape" in common usage still carries the suggestion of
something done by a man to a woman, some jurisdictions have
replaced it by such terms as "sexual battery" or "sexual as-
sault". In ever more jurisdictions, spouse rape is no longer rul-
ed out by definition. Prostitutes are no longer fair game for
rapists. Many jurisdictions have abolished the requirements
of resistance by the victim, of evidence corroborating the vic-
tim's testimony, and of prompt reporting of the crime in rape
suits. After all, there are no such requirements in cases of non-
-sexual battery, nor of robbery or murder, for instance. The
admissibility of evidence concerning the victim's sexual past
has been considerably restricted.
While this view of rape – which can be termed liberal – is
clearly preferable to the traditional one, there is one point on
which it might not be thought an improvement. The tradi-
tional view at least presented rape as a sexual crime. The lib-
eral view, it might be objected, assimilates rape to battery, and
thus fails to capture the sexual character of rape, the specifi-







reply, it can be said that rape appears as a unique, and
uniquely wrong, crime only against the background of a con-
ception of sex that endows sex with a special moral signifi-
cance: either the procreation view of sex or, alternatively, the
view of sex as bound up with love. But if one subscribes to nei-
ther of these views, one might not think of rape as somehow
unique; one might have no difficulty seeing it as, intrinsical-
ly, on a par with non-sexual battery. Without a certain theo-
retical background, it is not easy to show that rape is indeed
special, that it is different from non–sexual battery in a moral-
ly important way. If it is claimed to be unique because in rape,
unlike in cases of non-sexual battery, the assailant focuses on
the sexual, and thus most private, areas of the victim's body,
certain methods of torture that have the same focus provide
a damaging counterexample. If it is said that rape, unlike both
sexual torture and non-sexual battery, involves sexual gratifi-
cation of the perpetrator, one can point out in reply that more
and more jurisdictions now define rape with no reference to
either sexual gratification or sexual arousal of the rapist. (For
a discussion of rape as no more and no less than battery, see
Davis, 1984.)
II
The latter tendency is in line with the thesis, originally ad-
vanced in the pioneering feminist study of rape, Susan Brown-
miller's book Against Our Will, and subsequently adopted by
many feminist and other authors, that rape has little, if any-
thing, to do with sex, and everything to do with violence
(Brownmiller, 1975). But not every feminist account of rape
concurs. And even when it does, a radical feminist under-
standing of rape differs from the liberal on every other main
point.
Radical feminism rejects the methodological individual-
ism of the liberal approach to rape: the tendency to see rape
as but a discrete act of one individual upon another that of-
fends against the moral and legal norms concerning sexual
behavior. Rape can be truly understood only when interpret-
ed in its social context, as a distinct social practice. When ap-
proached in this way, and when the fact that almost all per-
petrators are men and almost all victims are women is given
its proper weight, rape can be recognized as the extreme ex-
pression of the basic characteristics of all gender relations in
our society. As an early radical feminist analysis of rape puts
it, "the special wrongness of rape is due to, and is only an ex-
aggeration of, the wrongness of our sexual interactions in
general" (Foa, 1977, 347). Rape is the most drastic epitome of








oppression of women by men. It is not a sporadic deviation,
but a deeply entrenched social practice that both expresses
and reinforces the inequality, degradation, and oppression of
women.
One way in which rape sustains male domination is in-
timidation. In developing this point, several radical feminist
authors have argued that rape functions as a terrorist social
practice. As Susan Griffin puts it in her influential article Rape:
The All–American Crime,
"rape is a kind of terrorism which severely limits the free-
dom of women and makes women dependent on men.
[...] The threat of rape is used to deny women employ-
ment. [...] The fear of rape keeps women off the streets at
night. Keeps women at home. Keeps women passive and
modest for fear that they be thought provocative. (Griffin,
1977, 329, 331; see also Peterson, 1997, and Card, 1991)
A good example of radical feminist analysis of rape can
be found in the writings of Catherine A. MacKinnon. She ar-
gues that in the type of society we live in, sexuality is "a social
construct of male power: defined by men, forced on women,
and constitutive of the meaning of gender. [...] Male and
female are created through the erotization of dominance and
submission. The man/woman difference and the dominance/
submission dynamic define each other" (MacKinnon, 1989, 113).
Sexuality is permeated through and through by gender ine-
quality and male dominance of women. This is true not only
of some, but of all sex: from "normal" intercourse to prostitu-
tion and pornography to sexual harassment and rape. MacKin-
non invites us to compare the reports of rape victims with
women's reports of sex and with the way pornography por-
trays sex, and claims that they all look very much alike. In
view of this, it is difficult to sustain the usual distinctions be-
tween the normal and the pathological and between violence
and sex. And rape must be acknowledged as "indigenous, not
exceptional, to women's social condition" (172).
MacKinnon rejects the argument that rape is not really
about sex but about violence, as it "fails to answer the rather
obvious question, if it is violence not sex, why didn't he just
hit her?" (134). The truth of the matter is that rape is inher-
ently both. The argument merely "makes it possible for rape
to be opposed by those who would save sexuality from the ra-
pists while leaving the sexual fundamentals of male dominance
intact" (135).
The liberal takes the presence or absence of consent as
the difference between legitimate sexual intercourse and rape.
That would be quite appropriate, if the social conditions in
which a woman gives or refuses consent were those of equal-







in which sex is negotiated in our society are not at all like that;
the far–reaching gender inequality and the domination of
women by men in all areas of social life vitiate any consent
that may be given. Much too often, perhaps even typically,
women engage in sex they do not want. They are made to do
so in all kinds of ways, ranging from actual violence to vari-
ous types of explicit or implicit coercion to economic consid-
erations or psychological pressures and needs. MacKinnon's
illustrations include having sex "as a means to male approval;
male approval translates into nearly all social goods" (147),
"acquiescence [to sex], the despairing response to hopelessly
unequal odds" (168), coercion "by something other than bat-
tery, something like economics, maybe even something like
love" (MacKinnon, 1987, 88), as well as the following: "... We
continue to stigmatize the women who claim rape as having ex-
perienced a deviant violation and allow the rest of us to go
through life feeling violated but thinking we've never been
raped, when there were a great many times when we, too, have
had sex and didn't want it" (88–89).
In view of all this, the very idea of consent is no longer
helpful nor, indeed, meaningful. Accordingly, MacKinnon pro-
poses that "rape should be defined as sex by compulsion, of
which physical force is one form. Lack of consent is redun-
dant and should not be a separate element of the crime" (Mac-
Kinnon, 1989, 245). However, we are not told just what is to
count as compulsion. In view of her examples quoted above,
it seems to be a very wide notion – wide enough to imply that
whenever a woman has sex with a man that she does not
want for its own sake, but engages in it for some extrinsic rea-
son, she is coerced, and therefore also raped.
The last conclusion is radical indeed; but it is by no
means atypical of discussions of rape in radical feminist writ-
ings. To give just one additional example, let me quote from
Robin Morgan's article Theory and Practice: Pornography and Rape:
... Rape exists any time sexual intercourse occurs when it has
not been initiated by the woman out of her own genuine
affection and desire. [...]Anything short of that is, in a radical
feminist definition, rape. Because the pressure is there, and it
need not be a knife blade against the throat; it's in his body
language, his threat of sulking, his clenched or trembling
hands, his self–deprecating humor or angry put–down or
silent self–pity at being rejected. How many millions of times
have women had sex "willingly" with men they didn't want
to have sex with? Even men they loved? How many times
have women wished just to sleep instead or read or watch
"The Late Show"? It must be clear that, under this definition,
most of the decently married bedrooms across America are









This kind of discourse may well have its uses; but it seems to
me that when rape is redefined in this way, nothing is gained
and much is lost, if what we are hoping for is discerning mo-
ral judgment and appropriate legal regulation of human sex-
ual behavior. By and large, sex that is not an expression of mu-
tual sexual desire compares unfavorably, as sex, with sex that
does embody mutual desire. But it is not at all clear that this
comparison translates into moral terms without additional ar-
gument. And even if such argument could be provided and the
translation accomplished, one central problem remains. When
the notion of consent is discarded and cases as different as a
woman forced to have sex by a knife at her throat, and a wo-
man having sex she has not initiated and does not want for its
own sake, but for any of the extrinsic reasons cited by Mac-
Kinnon or Morgan, are all lumped together under the head-
ing of "rape", we still need to be told just how wrong rape is.
I take it that MacKinnon, Morgan and other radical feminists
do not mean to suggest that cases of the latter sort should be
judged with the gravity appropriate in cases of the former
sort, nor the other way around. (If they did, those critics who
accuse them of either trivializing rape proper or wildly exag-
gerating the wrongness of "rape" would have a point. See e.g.
Gilbert, 1991/2, 10). But they also fail to provide any criterion
for the discrimination needed.
The obvious candidate for such a criterion is that of con-
sent, which we are invited to dispense with. At this point, then,
we need to look into the way the concept of consent is em-
ployed in the liberal conception of rape. It takes consent as
the criterion of demarcation between sexual intercourse that
does and intercourse that does not count as rape: rape is de-
fined as nonconsensual sexual intercourse. Now in the most
extreme case of rape a person is compelled into intercourse by
the use of sheer physical force. When that is not the case, a
person may be given a choice and may choose not to resist, or
even "go along with it". Whether that choice amounts to con-
sent, and thus rules out rape, will depend on just how it was
brought about. It may not amount to consent, and even if the
person concerned said "I consent" or something to that effect,
that may not count as valid consent, if she was coerced and
did not act voluntarily. But then again, it may. Whether it is
valid or not will depend on just how involuntary it was, just
how coerced she was into giving it. For while consent is an
all–or–nothing concept, the concepts of voluntariness and co-
ercion admit of degrees.
The relevant aspects of the complex relations between
these three concepts can best be set out by means of a list of503
different backgrounds to sexual intercourse between M and
W. What all the cases on the list have in common is that the
intercourse was neither initiated nor engaged in by W out of
sexual desire, but for an extrinsic reason, in response to a pro-
posal made by M.
(1) M threatens to kill or inflict serious bodily injury on
W if she will not have sex with him.
(2) M threatens to inflict grave economic harm on W if
she will not have sex with him.
(3) M invites W to join him on a trip in the mountains,
and deliberately gets them into a very dangerous situation
which W cannot survive on her own wihout serious bodily
injury, if at all. M offers to help if she will have sex with him.
(4) M comes across W (a stranger), who is in a very dan-
gerous situation she cannot survive on her own without seri-
ous bodily injury, if at all, and offers to help if she will have
sex with him.
(5) M offers to W, who is extremely poor and cannot pay
for the desperately needed medical treatment of her child, to
foot the bill if she will have sex with him.
(6) M, who is well–off, offers to pay W, who is not, if she
will have sex with him.
(7) M, who is well–off, offers W, who is not, a long–term
arrangement that involves his providing for her, and her hav-
ing sex with him.
In cases (1) and (2) W's consent is secured by M's threat.
All conditional threats of killing or inflicting serious bodily
injury or grave economic harm are coercive to a degree which
makes consent highly involuntary and therefore invalid in
any moral or legal context. Accordingly, in both cases W was
raped.
Unlike the first two, the remaining five are not cases of
threats but of offers. According to what is often termed "the
standard analysis of coercion" (see e.g. Bayles 1974), a threat
faces us with the prospect of harm and makes us do some-
thing against our will, thereby reducing our freedom. An of-
fer, on the other hand, presents us with a (comparatively) de-
sirable prospect, thus adding to our options and expanding
our freedom. Therefore offers, unlike threats, do not make us
do things against our will and are not coercive. But according
to another, more complex and more convincing view, ad-
vanced by Joel Feinberg, an offer can be coercive (Feinberg,
1986, Chapter 24). On that view, the offers made in cases (3),
(4), and (5) would be considered coercive, although not in the
same degree and with the same implications concerning the
validity of consent given in response. They are offers in that








able and thus expand her freedom overall. But they are at the
same time coercive in that they reduce her freedom with
regard to that particular option: she is coerced into choosing
it, however unattractive it may be in itself, since the sole alter-
native under the circumstances (death or serious bodily in-
jury in cases (3) and (4), death of the child in (5)) is utterly
unacceptable. The voluntariness of her choice is thus signifi-
cantly reduced. The question is whether she was coerced en-
ough, whether the voluntariness of her choice was reduced
significantly enough, for her consent to be made invalid, and
for the sexual intercourse involved to qualify as rape.
In order to answer it, we must look into the circumstan-
ces of making the choice and consenting to the offer. In case
(3) the circumstances that make the option bound up with re-
fusal clearly unacceptable to W were themselves put in place
by M; in cases (4) and (5), on the other hand, M exploits W's
predicament for which he is in no way responsible. The dif-
ference is both morally and legally significant. In Feinberg's
words, what we see at work in cases of the former type is "ac-
tive coercion which both creates and exploits a situation of
vulnerability;" the offer is "simply the climactic event in [a]
whole episode created to undermine [the recipient's] free-
dom" (Feinberg, 1986, 248, 246). Coercive offers of the latter
sort "enlarge [the recipient's] freedom in the circumstances, so
that [her] consent given those circumstances may be volun-
tary enough to be valid (for some purposes)" (246). The pur-
poses referred to are those of the criminal law. W's consent in
case (3) was coerced, and thus involuntary, to the extent that
it was rendered invalid, and therefore cannot rebut the
charge of rape. W's consent in cases (4) and (5) was also
coerced and thus not fully voluntary, but not in the same de-
gree; it is therefore valid as far as the criminal law is con-
cerned, and does rebut the charge of rape.
This, of course, does not mean that it is in no way moral-
ly flawed nor, indeed, that it would be valid for all legal pur-
poses. It is best described as an extreme case of exploited con-
sent. M's conduct is morally abominable: he is exhibiting com-
plete indifference to W's dire circumstances, and relates to them
solely as an opportunity to be exploited in order to coerce her
into doing something she would otherwise not do (see Map-
pes, 1992). And W's consent, thus procured, although valid for
the purposes of criminal law and sufficient to rebut the charge
of rape against M, would not be considered voluntary en-
ough and therefore valid for the purposes of the law of con-
tract. If M were to do his part of the bargain first and W then
reneged on her consent to have sex with him, M could not







As for cases (6) and (7), economic inequality is not en-
ough by itself to make an offer coercive. (If it were, most trans-
actions between individuals in most societies that have exist-
ed or are likely to exist would have to be considered coerced,
involuntary, and morally unacceptable, and the very notion
of consent would indeed no longer make much sense.) Thus
mentioning "rape" in such cases strikes me as odd. And I have
argued elsewhere that exchanges of this sort need not be mo-
rally wrong at all (Primorac 1993).
IV
Accounts of rape along these lines are challenged from the
radical feminist point of view. One objection is that the line
between cases that do and those that do not count as rape is
arbitrary. "Why should it matter," asks Keith Burgess–Jackson,
"whether the person who exploits another's vulnerability cre-
ated it? The harm is the same; the choice confronting the vul-
nerable party is the same; in both cases the exploiter hopes
the victim chooses one way rather than another. There seems
no good reason for the distinction" (Burgess–Jackson, 1996, 100).
But it seems to me that we do have an important reason
for making the distinction. What we are discussing is the mo-
ral and legal standing of an interaction between two persons.
If we are to pass judgment on it, surely we must take a good
look at the nature and degree of involvement of both. While
W has hardly any choice in all three cases, the character and
depth of the involvement of M is significantly different in
case (3), on one hand, and in cases (4) and (5), on the other, in
the way characterized above.
Another objection does not seek to undermine the dis-
tinction between first bringing about another's predicament
and then exploiting it, and exploiting another's predicament
for which one is in no way responsible, but rather questions
the application of the distinction to the subject at hand. It
connects with the thesis, mentioned above, that in a sexist so-
ciety rape functions as a terrorist social practice. In "Men in
Groups: Collective Responsibility for Rape" Larry May and Ro-
bert Strikwerda argue that in such a society all men, as a
group, are responsible for the prevalence of rape and the
ways in which it affects women. Moreover, this collective re-
sponsibility is distributive: not only the group itself, but each
individual member too is responsible (May and Strikwerda,
1994). Building on this argument, Keith Burgess–Jackson main-
tains that in a society like ours, when a man makes a coercive
offer to a woman with a view of getting her to have sex with
him, he does not merely seek to exploit a predicament for








affairs for which he, too, is personally responsible. "... He is
not like the bush pilot who happens upon a lost hiker. Rather,
he has participated in, reinforces, and is a direct beneficiary of
a regime in which women are induced by bush pilots to get
lost in the wilderness" (Burgess–Jackson, 1996, 100).
May and Strikwerda build up their case for distributive
collective responsibility of men for rape by making a number
of points; but ultimately it depends on the argument that in a
society like ours, every man benefits from the practice of rape.
The practice of rape imposes a kind of curfew on women, and
thus provides men with a comparative advantage with re-
gard to the freedom of movement. It also makes women de-
pendent on men for protection when they move about (see
May and Strikwerda, 1994, 146–148).
However, I find it difficult to appreciate these alleged
benefits, at least in the kind of society we live in today. The
freedom of movement is certainly a major benefit, but surely
it need not be a comparative one. There is no reason why
both men and women should not enjoy it, and when only
men do, its value is not enhanced by the fact that women do
not. And if a man has to provide protection to his wife, female
friend, or daughter, whenever she needs to go to certain
places at certain times, I should think that a burden rather
than a benefit. This is not to deny that some men may value
the benefits described by May and Strikwerda. But for the
argument to work, every man would have to; and that is
clearly not the case.
V
One final remark of a more general nature. Radical feminists
argue that all heterosexual sex that is not motivated by the
woman's genuine sexual attraction to, and desire for, the man
should be understood, and condemned, as rape. I have ar-
gued that this is much too indiscriminate an understanding
and much too sweeping a judgment. But I have no quarrel
with the conception of sex that motivates the radical feminist
stance. On the contrary, I trust it will be readily granted that
the portrayal of sex as something that is never bought or sold,
nor indeed engaged in with any ulterior purpose, but only
when two people are brought together by mutual sexual at-
traction, is very alluring.
Nor is it an exclusively feminist conception: socialist and
even liberal thinkers have advanced it too. It forms an impor-
tant part of the depiction of a truly human society in the writ-
ings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. According to Marx, in
such a society money would no longer hold sway as "the uni-







would no longer be true that "[if] I am ugly, but... can buy the
most beautiful woman, [that]means to say that I am not ugly,
for the effect of ugliness, its repelling power, is dest-royed by
money." Accordingly, sexual love could only be exchanged for
sexual love (Marx, 1984, 377, 379). Engels envisioned post–ca-
pitalist society as populated by "men who never in their lives
have known what it is to buy a woman's surrender with mo-
ney or any other social instrument of power," and women "who
have never known what it is to give themselves to a man
from any other considerations than real [sexual] love..."
(Engels, 1985, 114). And Bertrand Russell based his case for
far–reaching reform of sexual mores in part on the view that
"sexual relations should be a mutual delight, entered into so-
lely from the spontaneous impulse of both parties" (Russell,
1976, 101).
However, this conception of sex cannot do the work rad-
ical feminists entrust it with. The assumption that it can po-
ints to a confusion between moral rules and ideals. These two
types of moral considerations have different standing and
play different roles in morality. Moral rules, and requirements
and prohibitions, rights and duties based on those rules, con-
stitute the basis of morality. They are not optional, but oblig-
ate everyone who finds himself or herself in the relevant cir-
cumstances. Compliance with moral rules, respect for moral
rights, fulfillment of moral duties are required as a matter of
course, and do not call for admiration or praise. But offenses
against moral rules, infringements of moral rights, failure to
fulfill moral duties bring about moral condemnation. Moral
ideals, on the other hand, are not, and indeed cannot be pre-
scribed for everybody; their acceptance is optional. A person
who adopts a moral ideal and lives up to it may be appreciat-
ed, admired, praised for it. But a person who does not is not
properly subjected to moral condemnation on that account.
Such a person may be said to be failing to realize something mo-
rally valuable, but not to be doing something morally wrong.
It seems to me that the conception of sex as something to
be engaged in between persons sexually attracted to each
other can plausibly be advanced only as an ideal, and not as
an account of sex to be laid down as a moral rule binding all
and sundry, and justifying moral condemnation of those who
do not live up to it. Those whose sexual lives fall short of it are
missing out on something valuable; but they are not doing
something morally wrong.
Moreover, this conception is best advanced as a personal
ideal, rather than an ideal that a society could hope to realize.
Regrettable as it may be, the ideal society in which there is no








extrinsic purpose, and in which people have sex only out of
mutual attraction, has no prospect of coming true in our
world. For that would require a sort of sexual pre–established
harmony, in which every sexual desire meets with a comple-
mentary desire, while no persons too unattractive to be sexu-
ally desired by others are around.
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Silovanje je jedan od dru{tvenih problema u ~ijoj je raspravi
vrlo va`an doprinos feministi~ke filozofske, dru{tvene i
pravne misli. U ovome radu pisac poduzima kriti~ku
prosudbu glavnih postavki shva}anja silovanja u
radikalnome feminizmu: da silovanje nije devijacija, ve} prije
duboko ukorijenjena dru{tvena praksa koja izra`ava i
pothranjuje dalekose`nu nejednakost i ugnjetavanje `ene u
na{em dru{tvu; da u takvim uvjetima `eni nije mogu}e dati
valjanu suglasnost za spolne odnose sa mu{karcem i da,
sukladno tome, zlo~in silovanja ne trebamo definirati
pomo}u ideje odsutnosti suglasnosti; da nam je potrebna
nova definicija koja }e nam pomo}i da uo~imo kako je
silovanje u na{em dru{tvu mnogo rasprostranjenije no {to to
obi~no pretpostavljamo; da su svi mu{karci u na{em dru{tvu
kolektivno odgovorni za praksu silovanja. Kako bi procijenio
te argumente, pisac se usredoto~uje na kontrast izme|u
shva}anja suglasnosti na spolne odnose u liberalizmu i
radikalnome feminizmu. On nastoji pokazati kako je
radikalno feministi~ko shva}anje silovanja isuvi{e
nediferencirano i isuvi{e radikalno.




Das Phänomen der Vergewaltigung ist ein gesellschaftliches
Problem, bei dessen Erörterung das philosophische,
soziologische und juristische Denken des Feminismus einen
äußerst wichtigen Beitrag darstellt. Mit dieser Arbeit legt der
Verfasser eine kritische Beurteilung der Grundthesen vor, die
der radikale Feminismus bezüglich des
Vergewaltigungsdelikts vertritt. Diese Grundthesen lauten:
Vergewaltigungen sind keine Deviationserscheinung, sondern
eine tief in der Gesellschaft verwurzelte Praxis, wodurch die








unserer Gesellschaft zum Ausdruck gebracht und
untermauert wird; unter solchen Voraussetzungen sind
Frauen nicht dazu in der Lage, eine gültige Zustimmung zum
Geschlechtsverkehr mit einem Mann zu geben, und
demzufolge darf das Crimen der Vergewaltigung nicht
anhand der Idee der fehlenden Zustimmung definiert
werden; es wird eine neue Definition benötigt, die uns zur
Einsicht darüber verhelfen soll, daß Vergewaltigungen in
unserer Gesellschaft sehr viel verbreiteter sind, als weithin
angenommen wird; alle Männer in unserer Gesellschaft
tragen eine kollektive Verantwortung für das Phänomen der
Vergewaltigung. Um diese Argumente beurteilen zu können,
konzentriert sich der Verfasser auf den Kontrast zwischen den
Auffassungen von der Zustimmung zum Geschlechtsverkehr,
wie sie vom Liberalismus und vom radikalen Feminimus zum
Ausdruck gebracht werden. Er ist bemüht zu zeigen, daß die
radikale feministische Sichtweise des Vergewaltigungsdelikts
zu undifferenziert und zu extrem ist.
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